The Future of the Taliban’s Afghanistan: Chaotic Feudalism or Strong State?

Now that the Taliban have taken Kabul and the Afghan government has collapsed, the next big question arises: What is the new Taliban government going to look like? This is not only of massive importance for the Afghan people but for other governments as well, who need somebody to talk to. We will see that this question cannot be answered easily when feudalisms meets the modern nation state.

I. Structure and History of the Taliban

Painting a picture of the new Taliban Afghan state, which the Taliban call Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, requires understanding the structure of the Taliban themselves. After the Soviets had left Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet backed government in Kabul in 1992, different groups were fighting over controlling the devasted country.

It’s important to note that these groups were not organized like modern armies or nation-states but as tribal groups, that were led by charismatic warlords and separated by religious and ethnic fault lines. Members of these groups saw themselves as followers of a person, a special human whom they have pledged their obedience to. There was neither a common cause nor a bureaucratic organization that would stabilize these structures; people would follow the orders of their leader and the group would crumble if the leader died. It’s true that most Afghans adhere to the Islamic Law, the Sharia, which offers some insights into the structures of an Islamic state, but not in the detail modern nation-states are organized.

A warlord might have appointed subordinate leaders to administer to his growing realm, but these groups never developed a modern bureaucracy that transcended the leaders personal rule. Any subordinate leader was somewhat independent with little oversight from his superiors. Thus, such groups were notoriously instable and infighting was common, especially when the warlord himself died. These groups can easily be compared to organized crime, which operates on similar precepts. The term medieval rule is often used to describe the Taliban’s disregard of human rights but it is apt as well to their structure: It’s a feudal system of personal relationships instead of a bureaucratic modern nation state.

The Taliban were founded in 1994 by Mullah Omar in Kandahar, southern Afghanistan. After taking their hometown, the Taliban quickly spread over Afghanistan. Omar demanded that new members swore an oath of allegiance on his name. New subordinate leaders were appointed and the leaders of other groups as well joined. After taking Kabul, the ministries and bureaucratic structures of the Soviet-backed Afghan government were still in place and Omar tried to appoint new ministers that had to pledge their allegiance to him. Furthermore, a council consisting of tribal leaders was to be formed. In theory, Omar as so-called “Leader of the Faithfull” would have needed the council’s unanimous consent to rule but he often disregarded them.

II. A Tale of Two Bodies

We don’t know how the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will be exactly structured, but its labeling as Emirate points to an Islamic monarchy with an Emir as head of state. However, the structure of the Taliban themselves suggest that this will be a feudal monarchy. The monarch himself is somewhat weak and requires the support by his subordinate leaders, basically his nobility, who have pledged their allegiance. These leaders have their own subordinates, going so and so forth until the bottom, the day-to-day local rule, which is exerted by a local Sharia court and militants, both accountable to their local leader. As mentioned before, these groups are separated by ethnicity, tribalism, family relationships, and personal allegiance.

This puts the Taliban leadership and whoever they might appoint as Emir into a tough spot: They have to deal with largely independent warlords, who might try to topple the Taliban Kabul government any chance. Dealing with any rebellion requires the support of the other leaders, who will demand compensation for help. It’s Games of Thrones in the desert. As in the first rule of the Taliban, some regions will be de-facto independent, because their local rulers do not want to associate with the Taliban and the Taliban do not have the capacity to invade and control these areas.

Adding to this mess, the old structures of the Afghan government that are the various ministries and local bureaucratic structures are still in place. This ministries are vital to the Taliban because they provide functions that the Taliban feudal system cannot, for example supporting a banking system, healthcare, running complex infrastructure like airports or water supply and facilitating trade with other nations. Without these structures, Afghanistan would be thrown back into the early 19th century without access to modern innovations in healthcare or even enough food for her population. The local feudal rulers lack the knowledge to run things on their own and infighting between them will hinder any meaningful attempt.

No state can have two bodies. The system must be unified to function. Otherwise, both parts will get in conflict with each other. In the long run, either the feudal local lord or the bureaucratic central state wins. Thus, there are two possible outlooks for Afghanistan:

First, a strong central state. The Taliban leadership is able to quell any local resistance from local feudal lords and starts to build a centralized government. Security forces and local administrations are structured like in any modern nation-state and tightly controlled by Kabul. Any resistance is quelled by brute force. The head of the state might be an Emir, who – or a council of high-ranking Taliban or tribal leaders – decides on matters of the state. As Saudi Arabia and others have proven, it is possible to run a modern nation-state with medieval Islamic morals and total disregard of human rights.

Second, a feudal state. In this scenario, the Taliban are not able to deal with local resistance, the bureaucratic elements are crumbling and reduced to remnants in Kabul without any influence in the provinces. The Taliban leadership has limited influence on local politics. Some areas might be better managed than others, especially if the local warlord is able to establish a modern bureaucracy himself. A host of areas will become de facto independent. Other areas might seek to join neighboring states, like Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, since Tajiks and Uzbeks, being the majority in the northern provinces, are fighting the Taliban who are primarily Pashtu. Afghanistan will turn into a truly failed state, like Somalia.

III. Seeking International Legitimacy

At the moment, the Taliban are facing mayor challenges because the trade links with their neighbors are severed, the Afghan currency is crashing and the government is bankrupt, since the Afghan government has lost access to support and funds in the Western world. Any nation needs to be member of international organizations to facilitate international trade and, much more important, get development aid. If the Taliban are not able to get on board soon, they have to face a starving and even more impoverished population while having limited means of control.

Joining the international club of nations requires two things: Being recognized as legitimate Afghan government and being able to exert enough centralized control. Legitimacy means being seen by other states as the ruler of an area. This usually requires some degree of rule and matching the criteria of being a modern nation-state instead of a criminal organization, which is usually connected to some kind of adherence to human rights. The last Taliban government that collapsed in 2001 was only recognized by Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. All the whitewashing that is going on in Afghanistan, even the attempts to cooperate with the West and promising to respect the human rights of women, but under the Sharia, is required to distinguish them from mere terrorists. The Taliban try to hide their crimes to appear legitimate. As nations like Saudi Arabia or China show, the bar is not set that high.

Furthermore, some degree of centralized power is necessary to be able to go through with anything that international trade and cooperation requires, like having working border-checkpoints and to be able to guarantee security for international organizations operating in Afghanistan. Time will tell if the Taliban are able to cling to power or if Afghanistan will descend into total chaos, becoming a failed state.