Why Did Rome Not Conquer Germania? Limits of Imperial Expansion - Not the Barbarians’ Resistance

The story is well known, especially since Netflix made an adaptation called barbarians: In the year 9 AD, three Roman legions got betrayed and slaughtered in the deep, dark Germanic forests, deterring Rome from entering into Germania Magna ever since.

As always, the truth is more complex than that and the Battle of the Teutoburg Forrest was not the real reason Rome did not conquer nowadays Germany or other regions beyond its borders, like Scotland or Ireland. In short, these regions just were not developed enough in economic terms to justify an expansion. After all, Rome wanted to tax its provinces. A province that did not yield enough taxes to pay for the needed military resources and administration was a bad deal.

 

I. The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest

But first, let’s have a look at the circumstances of the Battle of the Teutoburg Forrest.

Under the rule of Emperor Augustus in the years around the birth of Christ, the Roman empire expanded into the Region known as Germania magna. Rome already had established provinces in Gallia, now known as France, reaching to the west banks of the river Rhine, and in Raetia and Noricum, now the southern Part of Germany, including Bavaria, reaching to the southern banks of the River Danube. The next logical step was the expansion into Germania Magna, Greater Germany, essentially the areas that nowadays are known as The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Poland, reaching to the North Sea and Baltic Sea and the vast forests of the east. Such an expansion did not only offer spoils of war and taxation but served the defense of the bordering Roman colonies that were under the threat of pillaging Germanic tribes.

How did Rome conquer an area and made it a province? Usually with a carrot and stick approach: On the one hand, Rome closed alliances with local leaders and clans, on the other, started military actions against those being defiant under the guise of some justified reason, for example the attack on an allied leader.

Doing so, Rome started to build fortifications on strategic points to secure its military dominance and levy tariffs on passing goods. Since most tribes and clans at this time were not able to siege such a fortification successfully, there was little that they could do. Over time, these fortifications developed into major cities which were big trade hubs and provided public amenities like Roman baths that were unknown to the local population before. They also served as hubs for the administration and taxation. From these cities, Roman rule and culture spread into the countryside, slowly dissolving the incumbent structures of clans and tribes, rearranging society.

Furthermore, Rome took hostages like sons of tribe leaders and other young male relatives that were brought to Rome. In Rome, these boys received higher education and even served in the Roman Army. The hostages quickly understood why life under Roman Rule was more comfortable than living free in a mud hut. Thus, these Romanized clan scions fostered Romes ambitions once back into their homelands, helping with the assimilation of the new province. Arminius was one of these boys brought to Rome, serving under the command of Varus, the Roman Governor tasked with establishing the province of Germania Magna.

In the year 9 AD, three Roman legions under Varus’ command were tasked with founding cities in Germania Magna as part of the annexation efforts. When returning to the Rhine for the winter months, Arminus told Varus about a rebellion that must be quashed, requiring a detour. Following Arminius’ advice, Varus rerouted the Legions through an unfavorable terrain, the Teutoburg Forrest, that forced the legions to march in long lines instead of a broad formation. Using this advantage, an alliance of Germanic tribes under Arminius’ lead attacked and annihilated the three legions in a brutal head-to-head combat. Varus died leading his soldiers. After mutilating the corpses and taking everything of value, the tribes withdrew into the forests.

The Battle of the Teutoburg Forrest saw some recognition in the works of classical Roman authors, since Emperor Augustus reign was the pinnacle of Roman literature, thus its circumstances are still know today. In modern times, the Battle of the Teutoburg Forrest was rendered part of the German national identity. From this reception stems the notion that this battle was decisive in preventing Roman occupation. Other European Nations too elevated local leaders that defied Roman Rule in this manner.

However, the Battle of the Teutoburg Forrest was by far no special or unique event. It cannot be compared to decisive defeats like Cannae that threated the existence of Rome. Rebellions were common in the Roman Empire and even the loss of whole legions happened from time to time. War was a constant in Rome and every war entails losses, sometimes hard hitting ones. Details of most of these Battles are lost in time, only the Battle of the  Teutoburg Forrest found some recognition at the literature of its time, thus being preserved to us. Other provincial battles are lost to us.

 

II. Logistics and Taxes

As mentioned above, the true reason was not the loss of three legions, albeit really hurting Emperor Augustus but the little incentive Rome had to annex Germania Magna.

At this time, the local Germanic tribes lacked the agricultural techniques that the Romans and other tribes like the Celts possessed, thus yielding less crops, the base for taxations. Furthermore, the Region was sparsely populated and difficult to access, since there was a lack of rivers that could be used to travel by ship from Roman territory deeper into Germania Magna.

Note, that rivers and the sea were the highways of the antiquity: They allowed cheap and easy transport of goods. Transporting goods on land, even on the highly developed Roman Roads, let alone the muddy paths one had to expect in Germania Magna, was a daunting task. It was literally cheaper to transport wheat from Egypt to Rome via the Mediterranean on Ship than 100 miles on land.

Given this circumstances, to annex Germania Magna, Rome needed a lot of manpower to control large swathes of hard-to-travel land and got little in return, not at last because the little tax yield was hard to transport. In an ideal world, Rome might had devoted resources, soldiers and time to develop its province into a high income province like it had done with Hispania. However, Rome just did not had the resources to spare for such an endeavor. Soldiers were needed on other war theatres – indeed, Varus lost part of his legions to quell a rebellion on the Balkans before his last campaign – and money was needed for public welfare and to levy even more soldiers. Sure, if the Germanic tribes had been peacefully, Rome would have picked the low hanging fruit, but none of Rome’s many provinces had been conquered in peace.

The same applies to the other borders of the Roman Empire: Scotland and Ireland too did not yield enough income to justify the expenses. Same goes for the Sahara desert in Africa that formed a geographic barrier that Rome did not pass. All this applies too to the Arabian Peninsula. Make no mistake: The areas beyond its borders were not terra incognita, unknown lands, to Rome. Rome did not only collect information provided by merchants on the border but send expeditions as well, some probably as far as the tropic regions south of the Sahara and even China. However, making these regions provinces did not make any sense because there was no apt way to transport goods and soldiers to and from these areas.

To conclude this section, not being a Roman province didn’t mean that an area was not under Roman influence. The border regions saw massive commercial activity and trade, which Rome put tariffs on. There was a huge cultural exchange and indeed the Germanic tribes acquired elements of Roman culture through the centuries. Roman techniques were learned and used as well. Furthermore, the Roman Army made expeditions beyond the borders to punish acts of pillage and sustained outposts deep into the border territory. Tight alliances with local tribes were forged. The only thing missing were mayor cities and a formal administration and taxation.

 

III. The universal principle of Expansion

In the End, every Empire’s borders are set by this universal principle of Expansion: An Expansion only works if the gains of the area are bigger than the costs of occupation. The defiance of the population is an element in this calculation, but will be overcome if the gains are bigger than military expenses. There are many examples of this:

The British Empire did not colonize areas which did not yield profit. India and the African colonies were highly profitable; but areas like Afghanistan were not, thus England refrained after abortive attempts. Afghanistan still defies any attempt of occupation.

The United States expansion into North America was delayed by the same principle: Even though the US early on acquired legal titles from European Nations on the areas further inland, the de-facto occupation required infrastructure or access to the coast or rivers large enough for ships. The Mid-West was developed by channels and later railways, which opened the Great Plains. Thus, the Great Plains were later developed than the State of California which had costal access.

Nowadays, the times of military occupation and integration into an Empire are over – at least for now. The Empires of our world rather try soft approaches to gain control and influence, like development aid and infrastructure projects and other poisoned gifts to force the target nation into dependence. China tries this with its Belt and Road initiative. However, the old rule still is valid: These projects must yield enough gains to justify the expenses. At the moment, China pours billions of US-Dollars into a bottomless pit without much to show. Time will tell if China’s Belt and Road initiative will be successful.

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